Mi amigo Peter es estupendo. Y me manda continuamente información, análisis, comentarios y enlaces. Leer y escuchar a Peter es saber mucho más qué ocurre y por qué. Pero, sobre todo, aprender de un estupendo y honrado profesional  que nunca aconseja a sus clientes lo que él mismo no hace.

Lo que manda Peter es, a veces, “para iniciados”. Como hoy. Pero con frecuencia no.

Peter manda también sus propios análisis. Los difundiré sin su nombre: él no quiere quiere aparecer, sino contribuir al bien de todos difundiendo lo que cree acertado.

Cuando tenga un rato, mejoraré el diseño de este Blog con secciones diversas que distingan noticias, videos, opiniones, informes, etc.

Una de las secciones será “LO QUE ME CUENTA PETER”. Él no lo sabe. No le digáis nada, quiero que sea una sorpresa.

Hoy solo pondré dos cosas interesantes que me manda Peter:

– La carta de Carmen Reinhart a Krugman.

Tendrían que leerla quienes dicen tantas tonterías. Y Krugman, que ha decidido el éxito y la alabanza frente a la seriedad y una mínima honradez intelectual.

Si no tenéis tiempo, podéis leer el extracto que hace Peter, que pongo más abajo.

Aquí la carta de Carmen Reinhart:


Aquí, un enlace a artículos en español de Carmen Reinhart:

http://www.carmenreinhart.com/espanol/  … 

Peter me manda también un video corto:

El “Abenomics” ya ha fallado muchas veces en Japón http://www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=z38V-i773aw#!

Y, por último,  aquí el extracto de la carta de Carmen Reinhart.


Some Fundamentals on Debt

First, the advanced economies now have levels of debt that surpass most if not all historic episodes. It is public debt and private debt (which often becomes public as a crisis unfolds). Significant shares of these debts are held by foreigners in most cases, with the notable exception of Japan.  In Europe, where the (public and private) external debt exposures loom largest, financial de-globalization is well underway.  Debt financing has become an increasingly domestic business and a difficult one when the pool of domestic saving is limited.

As for the United States: our only short-lived high-debt episode involved WWII debts, which were held by domestic residents, not fickle international investors or central banks in China and elsewhere around the globe.  This observation is not meant to suggest “a scare” in the offing, with bond vigilantes driving a concerted sell-off of Treasuries by the rest of the world and a dramatic spike US in interest rates.  Carmen’s work on financial repression suggests a different scenario. But many emerging markets have stepped into bubble-like territory and we have seen this movie before.  We should not take for granted their prosperity that makes possible their continuing large-scale purchases of US debt.  Reversals are possible.  Sensible risk management means planning for these and other contingencies that might disturb today’s low global interest rate environment.

Second, on debt and growth.  The Herndon, Ash and Pollin paper, using a different methodology, reinforces our core result that high levels of debt are associated with lower growth.  This fact has been hidden in the tabloid media and blogosphere discourse, but this point is made plain by even a cursory look at the full set of results reported in the very paper they critique.  More importantly, the result was prominently featured in our 2012 Journal of Economic Perspectives paper with Vincent Reinhart on Debt Overhangs, which they do not cite. The main point of our 2012 paper is that while the difference in annual GDP growth between high and lower debt cases is about one percent a year, debt overhang episodes last on average 23 years. Thus, the cumulative effect on income levels over time is significant.

Third, the debate of the last few weeks does not change the fact that debt levels above 90% (even if one entirely rejects this marker for gross central government debt as a common cross-country “threshold”) are very rare altogether and even rarer in peacetime.  From 1955 until right before the recent crisis, advanced economies spent less than 10% of those years at a debt/GDP ratio of higher than 90%; only about two percent of the years are above 120% debt/GDP. If governments thought high debt was a riskless proposition, why did they avoid it so consistently?

Policy response to debt with drama.  On the policy response to this sad state of affairs, we stress that restoring the credit channel is essential for sustained growth, and this is why there is a need to write off senior bank debt in many countries. Furthermore, there is no reason why the ECB should buy only sovereign debt-purchases of senior bank debt along the lines of the US Federal Reserve’s purchases of mortgage-backed securities would be instrumental in rekindling credit and working capital for firms.  We don’t see your attraction to fiscal largesse as a substitute. Periphery Europe cannot afford it and for Germany, which can afford it, fiscal expansion would be procyclical.  Any overheating in Germany would exert pressure on the ECB to maintain a tighter monetary policy, backtracking some of the progress made by Mario Draghi. A better use of Germany’s balance sheet strength would be to agree on faster and bigger haircuts for the periphery, and to support significantly more expansionary monetary policy by the ECB.
Finally, we attach, as do many other mainstream economists, a somewhat higher weight on risks than you do, as debts of all measure — including old age liabilities, public debt, private debt and external debt — ascend into record territory.  ……….. But interest rates can change much more quickly than fiscal policy and debt. 


Introduce tus datos o haz clic en un icono para iniciar sesión:

Logo de WordPress.com

Estás comentando usando tu cuenta de WordPress.com. Cerrar sesión / Cambiar )

Imagen de Twitter

Estás comentando usando tu cuenta de Twitter. Cerrar sesión / Cambiar )

Foto de Facebook

Estás comentando usando tu cuenta de Facebook. Cerrar sesión / Cambiar )

Google+ photo

Estás comentando usando tu cuenta de Google+. Cerrar sesión / Cambiar )

Conectando a %s